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their pages. Yet the books are skillful and sprightly. The photographs and illustrations have the ingratiating effect of making the
document and the institution that has interpreted it seem at once
majestic and ordinary. John Marshall, Dred Scott, and William
and Lillian Gobitis, in their own ways and in their own times, affirmed the rich brew of ideals and ambitions that form the essence
of American constitutionalism. To that extent, both books prove
the old saw that a picture is worth a thousand words.

SAVING THE REVOLUTION: THE FEDERALIST PAPERS AND THE AMERICAN FOUNDING. Edited by
Charles R. Kesler.' New York, N.Y.: The Free Press. 1987.
Pp. ix, 334. $29.95.
Harvey Flaumenhaft 2

We should make an effort to inquire into the principles of the
American political tradition before we abandon it as inarticulate or
indefensible-that is the message of this collection of essays, originally presented at a conference on The Federalist at the Henry Salvatori Center at Claremont McKenna College in 1985. The editor,
Professor Charles Kesler, believes that The Federalist was a great
achievement in political science, and that Publius remains the educator of a free people and the shaper of their future statesmen.
Professor Kesler claims that while The Federalist is more
widely read and perhaps more effusively praised than ever before, it
is nonetheless much misunderstood. The book which Kesler has
produced is a polemic, as was the book which it is meant to elucidate. It is, however, a polemic of a special kind. It praises The
Federalist for teaching by example a lesson in civility, and what it
praises, it practices. It is a very civil polemic, very helpful for
thinking about the informing spirit of the American republic.
In our day, says Kesler, the founders' defense of their work is
itself in need of defense against two sorts of critiques. On the one
hand, some prominent conservatives, who believe that there has
been a deterioration in the American citizenry and in its government, find a cause of that decline in the deliberate failure of the
I.
2.

Assistant Professor of Government, Claremont McKenna College.
Tutor, St. John's College in Annapolis.
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founders to provide for education in the principles and habits upon
which republican government depends. In this view, the founders,
unlike their ancient counterparts, chose to rely upon the self-interest of the citizens and the ambition of national office holders. Conservatives who hold this opinion of the founding tum to the
principles of less democratic ages, and of men whom they believe to
be wiser, for the inspiration and instruction that they do not find in
the political thought of the American founders.
Some influential liberals, on the other hand, who share with
these conservatives the view that the American founding does not
encourage healthy republican politics, draw the opposite conclusion. They believe that what the people need is not some imported
moral instruction, but rather an awakening to the progressive possibilities of direct or radical democracy, so that measures can be
taken to harmonize the Constitution with the spirit of our age.
Such liberals seek to liberate the people from governmental deadlock, the result of antidemocratic eighteenth-century mechanisms
which frustrate the evolving desires of the people for solutions to
our ever-multiplying social and economic problems.
Saving the Rerolution offers a more favorable view of the
founding. The Federalist is presented as teaching a two-fold lesson
in constitutionalism: first, the need for a permanent form of government anchored in a written constitution to protect the unalienable
rights of man and to serve the public good; and second, the inculcation of man's duties not only under the Constitution but also to it.
The Federalist is also presented as teaching a lesson in civility, providing an example of the sober, candid, public-spirited reflection required for a deliberation in which a people really chooses its
government. Sa.,ing the Re-.olution thus is meant to show how constitutionalism is taught. The Preface ends with these words by the
editor:
Claremont was the natural place to bold the conference that began this book, since
it was home for many years to the country's foremost scholars of The Federalist,
Douglass Adair and Martin Diamond, both now deceased. All of the contributions
to this book are indebted, in one way or another, to these men. Even those of us
who disagree more than we agree with them gladly acknowledge their writings as a
stimulus to our own thinking about The Federalist, and hence about America.

About this book it might be similarly said that those who think
seriously about America, and hence about The Federalist, even
those who disagree rather more than they agree with the contributions to the book, are likely to find in many of them an excellent
stimulus to thought.
The editor's Introduction presents the point of view that unifies
the book, together with an overview of its various chapters. The
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founders, says Kesler, sought to save the Revolution by constitutionalizing it. This meant providing the national government with
authority sufficient to meet the exigencies of union, securing a separation of powers that would protect the true principles of republican
government against both the ambition of the few and the folly of the
many, and confirming the equality of man in the rule of law. The
object of The Federalist was to contribute to education in self-government by teaching the necessity of that constitutionalization.
This teaching showed the importance of a national opinion that
would be enlightened, moderate, and just-as well as courageously
loyal to the preservation and good name of the republic. "Publius"
sought to persuade the opponents of the Constitution that the Constitution was the means to save the Revolution as well as republicanism itself; if our republic is to endure, then subsequent
generations also need to be shown the goodness of the principles of
the American republic.
The study of The Federalist in our own time, by making explicit what the Constitution means but does not say in so many
words, can help to correct the partial views of American conservatives who revere the Constitution but deprecate the Declaration of
Independence, as well as of American liberals who celebrate the
Declaration but are impatient with the Constitution (except for the
Bill of Rights appended to it). A comprehensive view, a view both
revolutionary and conservative, would bring together the doctrine
of the equality of human beings in their natural rights, and the doctrine of the organization of constitutional powers in the American
republic. This book is meant to help to form that comprehensive
view.

The chapters follow roughly the order of the topics addressed
by Publius, moving from papers on the Union to papers on the parts
of the government of the Union. Then, having treated the teachings
of The Federalist itself, the chapters go on to discuss other treatments of The Federalist, as well as to consider its effectiveness.
I

The first chapter is by Professor Kesler himself. His point of
departure is the prevailing interpretation of The Federalist's political science. According to this interpretation, says Kesler, The Federalist's political science has its source in modem political
philosophy-the writings of Machiavelli, Hobbes, Locke, and Montesquieu-and it has its core in Federalist No. lO's argument for an
extensive republic: by multiplying interests, the extensive republic
makes majority tyranny unlikely, though in doing so it also dilutes
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patriotism and gives society a predominant tone of self-interestedness. Kesler, by contrast, argues that in the teaching of The Federalist the role of No. 10 is not central but preparatory. According to
Kesler, the prevailing interpretation reads No. 10 as an epitome of
the whole Federalist, and questions the moral seriousness of republican citizenship in America, while he himself reads No. 10 as part of
a developing presentation, in which a teaching about the opinions
and habits required for republican citizenship is essential.
Since this controversy is in some ways a continuation of the
original debate over the ratification of the Constitution, Kesler's
chapter is followed by two chapters on the controversy between The
Federalist and the Anti-Federalists.
Murray Dry briefly presents The Federalist's direct response to
specific Anti-Federalist criticisms, after which he turns to the arguments of some influential Anti-Federalist critics. He shows first
how each side viewed the issue before the country and how it
viewed the other side, as well as how each side viewed the founding
in general and the compromises of the Convention in particular.
Then, before considering the debate about what chiefly concerned
the Anti-Federalists-federalism and the threat of a consolidation
of all power in the national government-he examines the two different views of republican government that lay behind that debate.
The subsequent examination of federalism itself involves two related
topics: the definition {and redefinition) of federalism, and the extent
of the legislative powers given to the Union (particularly the powers
to tax and to raise armies).
Dry's chapter is an excellent brief account of important aspects
of the founding controversy, and it is a very useful aid to reading
The Federalist. Although it does speak of the Anti-Federalist fear
of the aristocratic few, as well as of the Anti-Federalist emphasis on
mild government and citizen participation, this essay by Dry serves
the particular purposes of this volume mostly as a contrast to the
chapter by Broyles.
Broyles attacks the arguments as well as the motives of the
Anti-Federalists, and presents Publius as an advocate of high-toned
government which would elevate the nation morally. According to
Broyles, although the national government was meant to have only
a few specified powers, these were to go much beyond merely securing self-preservation; they were to enable the national government
to supervise the states' use of their many unrestricted powers.
While the various state governments might foster a variety of common opinions and actions, the national government was to foster
republican virtue properly understood as the vigilant and manly
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spirit in which those various opinions and actions were to be
judged. The national government was to engage in the spirited pursuit of grand objectives involving national character and dignity.
On the foundation of such national policy, public morals could
soar, especially when responding less to legislative attitudes and
more to the leadership coming from Publius's new invention, the
popular presidency.
Broyles writes to defend what he calls the founders' defense of
the Constitution's true federalism. He says that it needs defense
against contemporary Anti-Federalism. This, he says, was given
classic expression in Martin Diamond's sympathetic restatement of
what Diamond called the "small republic" argument, which went
so far as to imply the moral superiority of the Anti-Federalist position. Today, says Broyles, liberal and conservative academic partisans are battling over the spoils of a national government reduced
to the status of a mere facilitator. They do not notice, he says, the
position taken by the founders when they debated the AntiFederalists.
If that is so, however, this chapter by Broyles will not help as
much as it might have, had its argument been better articulated. As
an example of the sort of thing that does not do Broyles's case much
good, let the following suffice. Quoting the assertion, in Federalist
No. 35, that extensive information and a thorough knowledge of the
principles of political economy are necessary if taxes are not to be
oppressive or maldistributed, Broyles says: "This passage almost
goes to the extent of saying that a proper national tax policy will be
of itself sufficient to prevent oppression of the human spirit." But
the passage does not come anywhere near to saying what Broyles
sweepingly asserts that it does. This is not the only place where
evidence is poorly marshalled for an argument that is not tightly
put together.
After a pair of chapters on the constitutional significance of a
Union composed of many states, comes Patrick J. Garrity's essay
on The Federalist's treatment of foreign policy, the aspect of anation's affairs where its unity or lack thereof is hardest to ignore.
The editor sums up the contribution of this chapter by saying
that-unlike those of our contemporaries who separate idealism
and realism in debating foreign policy-Publius prudently unites
morality and utility; unlike those who unrefiectively call for bipartisanship, the authors of The Federalist realize that farseeing partisanship is required to bring into being a stable and respectably
bipartisan unity of morality and utility.
This chapter adds little to the treatment of the theme of the
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book, though it does speak truth about matters of importance. I
shall therefore not say more about it, but instead pass on to a closer
examination of the most important essay in this first part of the
book-the opening chapter on Federalist No. 10 and American republicanism, by Professor Kesler.

II
Kesler begins by discussing how The Federalist has been interpreted. He attributes to Martin Diamond (and, to a lesser extent,
Douglass Adair) the thesis that The Federalist is thoroughly modem and that the extended sphere is of central importance in its new
republicanism. Not only did Diamond insist that the Constitution
succeeded as a remedy for the ills of republican government because
of the extended sphere; he also considered this to be the most novel
and important theoretical ingredient in The Federalist. Publius, in
Diamond's view, broke with classical theory and practice, and accepted the Hobbesian statement of the political problem even
though he rejected the Hobbesian solution. In this novel solution to
the Hobbesian problem, liberalism and republicanism become, not
means for ascending to a nobler life, but means for solving Hobbesian problems more moderately. Thus interpreted, says Kesler, the
republicanism of Publius becomes merely a means to his liberalism,
to doctrines of individual rights and liberty bounded only by the
dictates of comfortable self-preservation. A republic, if extensive,
will take in a multiplicity of interests, so that a majority bent upon
injustice will have great difficulty in getting together and staying
together; thus the danger from majority faction will be much diminished-but the price, according to Diamond, is that the country
becomes crassly commercial. Politics becomes solid but low-acquisitive, selfish, narrow, and vulgar. Diamond's Publius deliberately promotes a politics that shuns the traditional goal of character
formation, and abandons the traditional emphasis on the teaching
of political opinions to the citizens as part of the shaping of their
character. Habits and opinions are left for cultivation to society,
which, though it be a realm of bourgeois virtue and even of republican virtue of a kind, will never rise high above self-interest, albeit
self-interest rightly understood. The founders, in this account, take
the lead in arranging to supply the defect of better motives by arranging for an opposition and rivalry of interests, but they do not
provide for or rely upon their being succeeded by men of the founding kind.
Kesler then gives an account of the genesis of the now-prevailing interpretation of The Federalist. More than half a century ago,
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Charles Beard fastened upon Federalist No. 10 as an authoritative
guide to American politics-singling it out, however, not for its argument on behalf of an extended sphere, but as the best existing
statement of the economic interpretation of politics. Beard's thesis
was later criticized by Douglass Adair. According to Adair, Publius did not teach that the clash of economic interests was a mere
continuation of the age-old class struggle between the few rich and
the many poor, but rather that it was an alternative to it. The extension of the sphere of republican government was a modern contribution to an old tradition in which political prudence had sought,
by favoring a stable middle- class regime, to moderate the conflict of
economic interests.
To the same question Martin Diamond brought a wider and a
deeper acquaintance with the history of political philosophy, combined with a powerful concern for its relevance to contemporary
American politics. Like Adair, he rejected Beard's economic determinism, while continuing to see in No. 10 the core of The Federalist. Diamond argued that although ancient political philosophy
(not, however, ancient political practice) was superior to modern
political philosophy, nonetheless the low-but-solid politics of interest groups that Publius promoted was preferable to the available
alternatives of rule by zealots or ideologues.
Kesler, though he expresses some mild appreciation of Diamond's work, rejects Diamond's view of the founding as "terribly
one-dimensional." (The chapter's seventeenth note cites a book by
Harry Jaffa for a critique of Diamond along the lines which Kesler
follows, and it cites as well some of Diamond's writings as showing
that Diamond himself was not unaware of the problems.) Diamond
was right to reject ideological politics, says Kesler, but he did not
properly distinguish political ideology from political philosophy.
To form citizens or to inform public opinion on the basis of abstract
truths is not in itself pernicious. In particular, a politics of interest
groups cannot be defended apart from the ends which it is intended
to serve and by which it is therefore legitimized-ends which must
exist in public opinion, the special care of the greatest statesmen.
To articulate these ends is the task of political philosophy. In order
to avoid cutting off modern American politics from the wellsprings
of the Western tradition, and even from the principles of its own
founding, rejection of ideology must be accompanied by reassertion
of the authority of political philosophy, and the politics of interest
groups must be justified by and incorporated into the larger politics
of public opinion.
Kesler believes that Diamond neglected the indispensability of
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traditional prudence in the politics of the founders. Prudence considers where one is going, how one gets there, what is the best that
can be done here and now, and how to instruct public opinion without scorning its backwardness, or flattering its vanity, or inflaming
its passions. In a regime of mere interest-group politics, prudence
may not be needed as much as realistic calculation and skillful maneuver, but in a republican regime where public opinion is everything, prudence is the most necessary virtue. In the "new science of
politics" -in Diamond's reading of The Federalist as derived from
modem political philosophy-prudence properly speaking is dethroned, and republicanism is made the servant of the liberal ends
of interest-group pluralism. Kesler says, however, that Publius
claims only to have added improvements to an already existing science, and the improvements have to do with only some of the means
to republicanism. "Publius," after all, was the name of an ancient
Roman statesman, a founder of the Roman republic. Our Publius,
according to Kesler, is not a radical innovator but a prudent
improver.
After discussing the interpretation of The Federalist, Kesler
turns to the plan of the book. Th~ Federalist is divided into two
parts. Its first thirty-six papers discuss what the Union is useful for
and what is needed for the Union. Only after this do the authors
discuss the republicanism of the Constitution. The Federalist, that
is to say, begins with the matter of the new nation, and only afterward treats its form. Only after treating necessities does it treat
good government and the relation between the ends of good government and the form of republican government. Coming first in the
rhetoric of Publius are appeals to necessity and the passion for selfpreservation, and only then come appeals to moderation and the
concern for what is honorable. Nonetheless, although the argument
of The Federalist is divided into two parts, these are parts of one
whole; the teaching about the limits which necessity places on
human choice is a preparation for choosing wisely when the merits
of the Constitution are finally presented in their own terms.
Having called attention to the difference between the part of
The Federalist which contains No. 10, and the part which follows it,
Kesler turns to the paper that immediately precedes and introduces
No. 10. The improved science of politics is introduced in Federalist
No. 9, says Kesler, in order to persuade the enlightened friends of
liberty to become republicans. Publius presents this introduction in
a very careful way, so as to suggest the limitations of the new science and avoid a simple identification of himself with Montesquieu.
Only later, says Kesler, will Publius let the reader see that Publius's
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case for the Constitution depends upon linking honor with republicanism. Publius's own science of politics is not the new science that
runs from Machiavelli through Hobbes to Montesquieu; it is rather
the old one as improved by prudence, by experience, and by new
instrumentalities that are suited to modern conditions.
Kesler then discusses faction, the problem with which Publius's improvements are meant to cope. What will control faction is
not mere Union, but only well-constructed Union-Union that will
appeal both to friends of republican government and to friends of
good government. Although Publius does soon establish the reciprocal relation between opinions and passions, it is passions or interests-and not opinions-by which factions are united and actuated,
according to No. 10. Federalist No. 10 does not propose a multiplicity of opinions as a solution to the problem of faction.
Kesler's discussion goes from the teaching of No. 10 on removing the causes of faction, to its teaching on controlling the effects of
faction; the bridge is a discussion of virtue and interests. Kesler
maintains that No. 10, in discussing the removal of the causes of
faction, refuses to reduce opinions or reason to the mere effects of
pre-rational or sub-rational causes, and thus it lays the groundwork
for the republican politics of public opinion. In doing so, it teaches
the few not to be unwise and the many not to attempt what is beyond their power. The opinions of the few and the many are also
combined in No. 10's account of interests. Interests in politics arise
from opinions. A constitutional politics that has a place for a multiplicity of interests must rest upon a certain uniformity of opinion.
Pluralism is not enough. Before human beings can be divided by
interests and sects, they must be united by citizenship. Interests
must be joined with virtue. The harmony of interests that underlies
the multiplicity of interests must be taught and learned, for selfgovernment requires rising above the interplay and mutual checking
of factions. Factious interests must be checked so as to allow for
the predominance of nonfactious interests. Kesler goes on to argue
that Publius thus does not simply advise controlling the effects of
faction: Publius teaches about causes, albeit informally, while
seeming to deal only with effects. He shapes the character of American citizens, albeit indirectly. His discrediting of pure democracy
as the standard for popular government is a preparation for his advocacy of a government that is exclusively representative.
Representation and the extended sphere is Kesler's final topic.
Representation, working through the forms of the Constitution,
turns interests into views that can be shaped to the public good.
Publius in No. 10 is contending, not for a multiplicity of factions,
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but rather for a multiplicity of interests informed by a common
opinion. This leads to the republican politics of the later papers. A
large republic is necessary to alleviate faction, but its size is insufficient for the purpose and can make the problem even worse.
Though representation seems in No. 10 to be merely a means for the
sake of the extended sphere, and the Constitution merely a means
for the sake of Union, it becomes clear later in The Federalist that
the large union is a means to the end of making popular government
better government-by making the government less directly popular, and by constitutionalizing the passions and the interests of the
people. Kesler argues that No. 10 overstates the case for the extended sphere, though it does so for good rhetorical purposes.

III
Perhaps Diamond too overstated his case for rhetorical purposes. I have heard him quoted as having said that among the lessons on rhetoric which he had learned from many years of public
speaking were "never say merely that Manhattan is an island, but
say instead that Manhattan is an island entirely surrounded by
water," and "when in Rome, correct the errors of the Romans."
Diamond's writings were more akin to modem public speeches than
to classical writings of political philosophy. In the forum where he
spoke, appeals to antique virtue would not have gotten much of a
hearing, whereas his appeal to what was "low but solid" enabled
him to make some headway in his struggles with the left, both old
and new.
Although generously accepting the constraints under which
Diamond did his work, Kesler tries to show that the result was a
distortion of the teaching of the founders. Kesler speaks much
truth in this chapter, and some of it is truth much needed. At times
he may squeeze a bit too much out of a few words from Publius, but
this is a relatively minor fault, considering the prevalence of cursory
reading in our time. More serious is the exaggeration in Kesler's
contrast between the two parts of The Federalist-the one on
Union, and the other on the form of the government proposed for
the Union. There is something to what he says, but I find in the
latter part of Publius's discussion more of a concern for harsh necessity than Kesler implies, and I do not find in the earlier part such
shrewd calculation in the service of continuity with tradition.
The formation of opinion, after all, can serve very different
purposes--even the purposes of the founders of that new political
science which relies upon the interplay of passions. Hobbes, for
one, makes it very clear that the interplay of passions cannot do its
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low but solid work unless those who have a monopoly on the legitimate use of force maintain the enlightened opinions needed to support his scheme. Not only heat but light-relentless propagation of
the right opinions-is essential to the struggle against what he calls
the kingdom of darkness.
In considering the American founders we must therefore ask
not whether they. sought to promote opinions, but rather what were
the opinions that they fostered. It is difficult to imagine anything
on the level of The Federalist appearing in political debate today.
Do the founders bear no responsibility at all for this? They may not
have sought to lower public life in order to make it more solid, and
some things may, because of the work of the founders, be higher
today than they were in the days of the founding, but are there
nonetheless some things that are lower now, and lower because of
things the founders taught? The teaching of the founders may not
have been as low as some have said it was, but was it quite as lofty
as Kesler now suggests? And the dignity that it did have-was that
simply due to what in it was classical or traditional?
When Alexander Hamilton dropped out of college to take a
military part in the struggle over taxation without representation,
for a time he kept his reading notes in the paybook of the artillery
company that he organized, and the notes that were kept by this
future "Publius" and public financier-to-be were pretty much divided between Plutarch and Postlethwayt. The latter of this pair of
writers from whom he obtained inspiration and instruction was the
author of a book called The Universal Dictionary of Trade and Commerce-a fact which goes along with the fact that the teacher to
whom he seems to have recurred for wisdom was not Plato so much
as Hume. Moreover, when he formed the intention, in his later life,
to preside over an immense project of research and writing in political science, he named as its tutelary spirit not Aristotle but Bacon.
We must ask ourselves: Does Kesler, though for good rhetorical
purposes, overstate his case?
IV

Kesler's chapter on Federalist No. 10 and American republicanism is the first in the set of chapters on The Federalist's first part
(on the Union). The first chapter in the set on The Federalist's second part (on the particular form ofthe government of the Union) is
William Kristol's discussion of the separation of powers in The Federalist Nos. 47 through 51. Kesler, in his Introduction, says that
Kristol redirects our attention to the separation of powers as The
Federalist's greatest contribution to political science. According to
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Kesler, Kristol shows how radically the principle of separated powers cuts across the popular principle, and therefore to what extent
the American regime may be understood as an approximation
under modem conditions to the classical idea of the mixed regime;
he shows, says Kesler, that the separation of powers makes the
American form of government more aristocratic than it otherwise
would or perhaps even could be, which in tum affects, however indirectly, the character of the American people. Kristol himself does
not quite say this, but Kesler is led to say it by what Kristol does
say.
The point of departure for Kristol's chapter is the following
thought: although the separation of powers is an authoritative principle in interpreting the Constitution, it is nonetheless a curiously
obscure one. Kristol suggests that an examination of Publius's general discussion of the principle in Federalist Nos. 47 though 51 may
help us to begin to understand such questions as these: By what
principles are the powers separated and distributed? What is the
character and purpose of each power? What is the relation between
the principle of the separation of powers and the principle of republicanism? Why does Publius hesitate to confront these questions
directly, so that the principle of the separation of powers as a whole
seems so indirect or opaque?
An understanding of the separation of powers and its underlying principles is the key to understanding the structure of government established by the Constitution, according to Kristol. Indeed,
he says, the central question of The Federalist is the relation between the government's general form, which is republican, and its
particular structure, informed by the principle of separation of
powers.
In keeping with Publius's general hesitancy to lay out principles, Kristol continues, the discussion of the particular structure of
the federal government is introduced, in No. 47, as a response to an
objection. The discussion begins with a curious abstraction from
the differences between the various forms of government, and with a
curious recurrence to the authority of Montesquieu, who himself is
somewhat indirect. The separation of powers, which will impede
direct recurrence to the people as a principle of government, is itself
introduced indirectly, says Kristol.
Publius then concentrates on the maintenance of the separation
of powers for the sake of liberty, rather than on the correct distribution of power and on what makes it correct. The question that is
first for us takes priority over-and obscures-the question that is
first in itself. For us, the requirements of republican government
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must be shown to be met before the requirements of good government can be.
Before presenting his own solution to the problem of maintaining the separation of powers in No. 51, Publius in Nos. 48-50 shows
the insufficiency of some other solutions. His criticism of the first
solution (parchment barriers), in No. 48, is the occasion for a criticism of the state constitutions and therewith also of the inadequate
view of republican government informing them. In that view, separation of powers is a support for, rather than a check upon, the
power of the legislature--the republican branch par excellence. In
Nos. 49-50, Publius goes further. By rejecting the solution of
resorting to the people, he makes it clear that rule by the people-the republican principle itself-is in tension with the maintenance
and even with the purpose of the separation of powers. The Constitution, whose principle is the separation of powers, becomes an authority over the people who authorize it. The Constitution derives
its dignity from two different sources: its being an act of the people,
on the one hand-and, on the other, its being an embodiment of
standards of good government outside the people's will. Popular
government and good government are not simply identical. To
bring them together, insofar as it is possible, is the statesmanship of
Publius. Kristol contends that wisdom and consent are linked by
uniting time and numbers: the American regime is to be supported
by the double effect of a popular origin and a lack of recurrent appeals to the people.
Publius's discussion of his own solution to the problem of
maintaining the separation of powers, in No. 51, shows the source
of the difficulty that we encounter in thinking and speaking about
the Constitution: politics requires the reconciliation of different
principles that must be mixed in the structure of the government.
By the end of No. 51, the central and general theme of separation of
powers has given way to the peripheral and particularly American
theme of federalism and of the extended sphere which it allows,
thus mitigating any apparent tension between the separation of
powers and republican government.
Publius's discussion of the particular powers in the sequel
(Federalist Nos. 52 through 83), Kristol says, will teach us more
about the separation of powers and about the character of each of
the powers; it will teach us in more detail about how the principles
of the separation of powers can be incorporated into the republican
form of government in America so as not to disturb the republican
cause, and indeed to vindicate what is true in the republican cause.
We'll learn this not only from what Publius will say, but also from
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how he will say it. It is as a preparation for this, that the republican
principle is modified in the course of the discussion that occupies
Nos. 47 through 51, says K.ristol. At the end of No. 51, when Publius again brings republicanism to the fore, he obscures the extent to
which the republican principle has been modified, and he shows by
this how the separation of powers can be inconspicuously accommodated to the republican form of the American regime.

v
Let us consider K.ristol's chapter in the context of the editor's
intention to oppose the prevailing interpretation of The Federalist.
Kesler in his own opening chapter rejects the view that No. 10 is the
core of The Federalist's teaching of a new science of politics. That
paper, he says, is a step on the way to presenting the new republic of
the Constitution, and the core of The Federalist is its improved republicanism. The new republic's ends are old; only some of its
means are new. Extension of the republican sphere is one of the
new republican means, but it is not the central feature of The Federalist's republicanism.
Kristol's chapter presents the teaching of Nos. 47 through 51
as a preparation for the central question of The Federalist. The central feature of The Federalist's republicanism is the separation of
powers. The separation of powers is obscure and is presented indirectly because its principle is not the republican principle. Republican government with a separation of powers is questionably
republican. It is a mixture of what is republican and what is not
republican.
The editor in the Introduction gives a summary restatement of
Kristol's chapter. Is this restatement a more direct and less obscure
statement of what Kristol means? If so, is K.ristol's chapter more
politic-more Publius-like-than the editor's restatement of it? Or
does Kristol not go so far as Kesler says he goes? Does Kristol
merely avoid asserting, or would he in fact deny, what Kesler suggests-that the founders sought indirectly to elevate the character
of the American people by introducing something like aristocracy
into the American republic in the guise of a device for protecting
liberty?
Is the United States, that is to say, a mixed regime in mask, or
is it a purely popular regime of liberty improved in its effectiveness
by a separation of powers which renders it complex? Perhaps the
teaching of The Federalist is neither low nor lofty, but is rather
squarely in the middle. If the problem of the separation of powers
is the problem of republicanism in America, what is the best way to
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characterize that problem? Just what is the non-popular principle
that needs to be mixed with the popular? Is Publius being disingenuous when he speaks in terms of combining energy with republican
safety, and of giving efficacy to popular government? When Publius
speaks of energy, stability, and efficacy, is he merely being politic in
not speaking of a mixed regime-or would it be better to say that
Publius is himself committed to a test of purely popular government
not merely because it is unavoidable in the circumstances but also
because a purely popular government, if it can somehow be made
effective, is desirable in itself?
Publius is hardly shy about publicizing his belief that popular
government is not as such identical with good government. Indeed,
he is probably more candid than someone in his position would be
today. Popular government is not as such good government, but
from this it does not follow that good government as such is mixed
government. It may be that, while mixed government can be something not so bad, nonetheless a fairly good popular government
would be even better. Perhaps a purely popular government, with
non-popular ingredients to make it effective, would be a very good
government-one that it would be misleading to call an aristocratic
republic.
A government that is purely popular cannot contain any parts
constituted by a part of the population other than the people, but it
can be a complex of parts that structures the people's choosing and
thus be not simply popular, just as a well-trained horse, while it is
not simply a horse, is nonetheless purely a horse-rather than a
mixture like a mule. (I am aware that someone might seize upon
this to suggest that horses are trained to be ridden by a superior
being, booted and spurred, but I do not mean to suggest it.) Consider the Senate. With respect to that institution, the non-popular
principles of The Federalist have to do not so much with different
sorts of human beings-not so much with indirect influence for the
wise and virtuous, the rich, or the well-born-as with establishing
incentives and impediments that will increase the likelihood of certain kinds of effects which, far from going counter to the persistent
wishes of the people, will please the multitude in the long run.
What Publius hopes will be particularly characteristic of the Senate-with its continuity as a body, and the duration of the terms of
its members-is a tendency to promote stability and foresight.
Take for example what he says about how its members will have
incentives to acquire a knowledge of foreign affairs which would
otherwise be lacking in the government. Or consider the judiciary.
What Publius regards as being essential to their work, and as setting
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them apart, is the independence which can foster impartiality and
non partisanship.
Even readers who question the conclusions of Kristol and Kesler will learn much from their close reading of The Federalist, and
from the remaining chapters of the book, about which, unfortunately, time does not permit me to say very much.
VI

The discussion of The Federalist No. 51 is continued by William B. Allen, in a chapter whose theme is not the separation of
powers, but rather the concern of Madison for the centrality of justice in the life of the people. Allen throws much light on this by
bringing in some other writings by Madison.
There is no chapter on the legislature as such (or on the Senate), but there is an excellent chapter by Thomas G. West on the
rule of law in The Federalist. After introducing the rule of law as a
consequence of the principles of the American Revolution, West
proceeds to the separation of powers and the need for a written constitution, and then to the meaning of legislative balances and
checks, after which he treats the relation between representation
and excellence, and then safety and happiness, as the ends of legislation. A reader interested in the question of how low or lofty were
the aspirations of the founders would do well to depart from the
order of the chapters, which seeks to parallel the order of the papers
in The Federalist, and read West immediately after Kesler.
On the other hand, for the question of how central is the teaching of the extended republic, a reader would do well to move from
Kesler immediately to Kristol, and then to the chapter immediately
after West's, which is Harvey C. Mansfield, Jr.'s essay on the executive. Its theme is the The Federalist's achievement in showing that
an energetic executive could be republicanized. Mansfield, in showing how this easily underestimated feat was accomplished, employs
the notion of the constitutionalizing of necessities. This fine discussion points the reader in a somewhat different direction from that
suggested by Kesler and West. In other words, the question of how
to state the problem of republican government remains a question in
this book. One author makes it seem that what the republican principle needs is the admixture of a principle of aristocracy, while another makes it seem that what is needed is a principle of
effectiveness. What the editor has given us is not a catechism but an
inquiry.
Next comes Jeremy Rabkin's chapter on post-Publian executive officialdom-on how The Federalist understands good adminis-
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tration as "value"-laden politics, in contrast to those European
thinkers whose views were later very influential in the theory and
practice of late-nineteenth and twentieth-century American public
administration.
The chapters on executive power are followed by James
Stoner's discussion of constitutionalism and judging in The Federalist. Stoner discusses the questionable status of judging in the American republic, the limits of Publius's treatment of it, and the need to
recur to the common law for light upon the question.
Following this discussion of judicial power in America, its
great instrument (the Bill of Rights) becomes a question in Ralph A
Rossum's chapter on The Federalist's understanding of the Constitution (without the Bill of Rights) as itself a bill of rights.
These chapters on the content of The Federalist are followed by
two chapters on the reading given to The Federalist before the nowprevailing interpretation arose. Jack N. Rakove shows how The
Federalist was used in public controversy during the century following its publication, and then Dennis J. Mahoney shows how the rise
of American political science in the half century after the Civil War
involved the rejection of the teaching of The Federalist in the name
of progress, until Beard's revival of its reputation provoked the critiques of Beard's interpretation by Douglass Adair and Martin Diamond-which is where this book begins. It ends with a chapter by
Edward C. Banfield, reminding us that the success of what The Federalist sought to promote by reflection and by choice was in fact
largely the result of chance.
But chance favors the prepared mind, as a great experimenter
once said. Few books prepare us as well as does The Federalist for
thinking about that great experiment in human affairs which is the
regime in which we live. And few books take the thought of The
Federalist as seriously as this one does. Reading it, and thinking
about what we read, will help us to understand The Federalist
better.

